mission partner

Primary use of SIPRNET; the inability to speak to all mission partners simultaneously, if needed; and too few ad-hoc inter-connection points between national systems. Before the Afghanistan Mission Network, ISAF ran on four separate national and alliance networks while US formations defaulted to SIPRNet, which no coalition partner could reach.

Because there was increased risk when information was not shared — the net effect of the information-sharing limits in Afghanistan was increased risk to life, inefficient use of resources, and jeopardized mission accomplishment. Note: the doctrine and lessons-learned literature calls this same cultural shift “need to share”; “share-to-win” is the course's own phrasing.

MPE users leverage key attributes of the Joint Information Environment (JIE) IT infrastructure, enterprise services and architectures to share information on a single security architecture. The MPE capability framework is inextricably linked to the JIE, which supplies the infrastructure, enterprise services and single security architecture that let a joint force commander stand up a coalition mission network instead of relying on SIPRNet.

What information can be shared, what information will be shared, and how the information will be shared. What can be shared is a foreign disclosure decision — the foreign disclosure officer is the release approval authority — and how it is shared has to protect the source.

True. The FDO is the approval authority for releasing military information to foreign government representatives, so FDOs must be involved early in the planning stages to determine the appropriate levels of classification, and the joint force J-2 should obtain FDO authorizations as soon as possible.

Sharing practices that represent a significant shift from a "need to know" environment to a "share-to-win" culture; all partners share information equally within one releasability caveat for planning, situational awareness and execution; and there are no guards restricting data and information flows. Note: the Army's MPE handbook names the destination culture “need to share,” not “share to win.”

False. MPE closed the command and control gap by leveraging the Joint Information Environment — its shared IT infrastructure, enterprise services and single security architecture — not the Global Command and Control System Family of Systems.

Single level security architecture is the answer the course key expects. Note: DoD CIO's MPE Lexicon and DoDI 8110.01 both define the JIE as shared IT infrastructure, enterprise services and a “single security architecture” — the doctrinal phrase is single security architecture, with no “level” in it. “Single security level” belongs to the definition of the MPE mission network, not to the JIE.

Identify the strategic direction and operational environment, define the problem, and develop an operational approach. Note: JP 5-0 words the first two as understand the strategic direction and understand the operational environment; the answers to those three questions are what produce the operational approach.

True. The JIE is the IT capability and infrastructure that lets a joint force commander establish an MPE for coalition operations, putting all network users on a common mission network separate from their own national networks — which is exactly what the Afghanistan Mission Network did.

Because SIPRNET constrained the commander's ability to combine and tailor Allied and coalition forces to realize their full warfighting potential. Relying on SIPRNet produced a command and control structure that gave commanders little to no ability to combine US and non-US formations in the same battlespace, and SIPRNET is meant solely for US-specific communication and tasks not suitable for a multinational information-sharing environment. (Joint Force Quarterly words it “full combat potential.”)

False. In 2008 commanders noted that coalition forces in Afghanistan could not effectively communicate and share commander's guidance, mission information and critical intelligence, because the networks supporting the operation were nation-specific and not oriented to coalition data sharing; using those separate networks resulted in fragmented mission command.

Train and operate. DoDI 8110.01 states that the JIE — shared IT infrastructure, enterprise services and a single security architecture — supports mission partner operations, exercises and training, and that mission networks are implemented using a single security domain to ensure the uninhibited flow of information.